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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of public credit lines in promoting the 
performances of Brazilian firms. We focus on the impact of the credit lines 
managed by BNDES and FINEP in fostering growth measured in terms of 
employment, labor productivity and export. For this purpose, we use a unique panel 
data set developed by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), which 
includes information on both firm-level performances and access to public credit 
lines. This particular data setting allows us to use quasi-experimental techniques to 
control for selection bias when estimating the impact of the public credit lines. The 
core of our estimation strategy is based on a difference-in-differences technique, 
which we complement with matching methods for robustness check. Our results 
consistently show that access to public credit lines has a significant and robust 
positive impact on employment growth and exports, while we do not find evidence 
of a significant effect on our measure of productivity. Interestingly enough, our 
findings show that impact on exports is driven by the increase in export volumes 
among exporting firms, while no significant effect on the probability of becoming 
an exporter is detected. 
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1. Introduction  
Public credit plays an important role in supporting the Brazilian productive sector. Data show 
that the presence of the public sector in the banking sector is high. The largest state owned 
development bank –the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES)– accounted for 11 
percent of all outstanding credit in 2006. Considering that the state also owns two of the three 
largest commercial banks in Brazil, the percentage of outstanding credit accounted for state-
owned banks increases to around 44 percent. Although the importance of the public sector in the 
Brazilian financial system has been broadly debated, not much has been said on the effectiveness 
of these policy instruments in improving the conditions of final beneficiaries of these resources.  
This paper aims at shedding some light on the effectiveness of public credit programs in 
promoting the performances of the productive sector in Brazil. In particular, we focus on the 
impact of the credit lines managed by BNDES and FINEP in fostering growth measured in terms 
of employment, labor productivity and export. For this purpose, we use a unique panel data set 
developed by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), which includes information 
on both firm-level performance and access to public credit lines. This particular data setting 
allows us to use quasi-experimental techniques to control for selection bias when estimating the 
impact of the public credit lines. The core of our estimation strategy is based on a difference-in-
difference technique, which we complement with matching methods for robustness check.  
Our results consistently show that access to public credit lines has a significant and robust 
positive impact on employment growth and exports, while we do not find evidence of a 
significant effect on our measure of productivity. Interestingly enough, our findings show that 
impact on exports is driven by the increase in export volumes among exporting firms, while no 
significant effect on the probability of becoming an exporter is detected. 
The scope of this paper is mainly empirical and its contribution to the existing literature 
should be considered in this context. This means that we do not develop any formal model aimed 
at assessing the theoretical linkages between access to credit and the firm-level performances. 
However, we complement our empirical analysis with a brief discussion of these linkages in light 
of the existing literature. To put our paper into context, we also review the most recent impact 




The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, section one provides a brief 
review on the justification of public credit program aimed at fostering firm performances and on 
the evidence that have been produced on the effectiveness of such programs. Section two 
discusses more in detail the main characteristics of public credit programs in Brazil, with 
particular emphasis on the credit lines managed by BNDES and FINEP. Section three describes 
the data we are using for our analysis, including a review of the main basic statistics of interest. 
Section four discusses our identification strategy, focusing on the approach we adopted to control 
for selection biases. Section five presents the results of our estimations. Finally, section six 




2. Discussion on Potential Impacts of Public Credit Programs 
The fact that informational asymmetries generate credit constraints appears to be a consensus in 
the literature at least since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In turn, the fact that financial constraints 
may hinder firm performance has also been well-studied. For instance, poor access to financial 
markets may negatively affect firm growth, especially among small firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2005). Rendón (2000) shows that capital market imperfections may restrict the 
creation of permanent jobs, and remarks the importance of removing financial constraints to 
promote job creation, particularly in economies with a high proportion of small firms. Moreover, 
lack of access to credit may prevent firms from exporting, since this practice involves entry costs 
related acquiring of information about foreign markets, customizing products to fit local tastes 
and setting up distribution networks (Minetti and Zhu, 2010). Bellone et al (2010) claim that, in 
this context, public intervention can help efficient but financially constrained firms to overcome 
these fixed entry costs and expand their activities abroad. 
Thus, in presence of financial constraints, public financing may be an effective 
alternative to boost firm performance. In fact, several empirical studies show that public credit is 
successful in relaxing financial constraints. For instance, Aivazian, Masundar and Santor (2003) 
find that the World Bank’s Small and Medium Industries program in Sri Lanka led to a 
relaxation of credit constraints and higher levels of investment for firms that received the 
subsidies. This effect is, however, rather limited, not least because of the relatively small amount 
of resources committed to this purpose.  
Another finding of their analysis is that the public guarantee lowered the SMEs’ 
borrowing cost to a substantial extent. Banerjee and Duflo (2004) exploit the exogenous 
variation generated by a policy change in India to test whether firms are credit constrained based 
on their reaction to changes in directed lending programs. According to the authors, while both 
constrained and unconstrained firms may be willing to absorb all the directed credit that they can 
get, constrained firms will use it to expand production, while unconstrained firms will primarily 
use it as a substitute for other borrowing. Their findings reveal that credit is used to finance more 
production, which implies an increment in the rate of growth of sales and profits; this provides 
evidence both on the existence of credit constraints and on the possibility of mitigate them 
through public credit. Finally, Bach (2009) tests if the French loan program CODEVI succeeds 
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in improving access to credit for small French firms. The results show that access to the 
financing subsidy substantially increased debt financing on the firm side. However, this did not 
lead to significant substitution between subsidized and unsubsidized financing channels, which 
can be taken as evidence of financial constraints. 
As to the impact of credit programs on firm performance, to our knowledge, none of the 
extant studies rely on experimental designs to evaluate this type of programs. Instead, the 
literature focused on non-experimental techniques aimed at eliminating or at least mitigating 
selection biases that are pervasive in this context since participation depends both on 
administrative eligibility criteria and individual decisions of the firms. The most popular 
approach, and the one used by all the evaluations described here, consists on applying difference-
in-differences methods to panel databases combined with propensity score matching techniques 
to ensure the similarity between participants and non-participants.  
Hall and Maffioli (2008) offer a review of empirical evaluations in Latin America. 
According to the authors, studies reveal generally positive effects of credit programs on 
intermediate outcomes like R&D expenditures, worker training and the introduction of new 
processes and quality control practices, especially in developing countries (López Acevedo and 
Tan, 2010). However, the evidence on the impact on longer-term performance outcomes like 
sales growth, exports, employment, labor productivity and TFP is mixed. For instance, 
Chudnovski et al (2005) analyze the FONTAR in Argentina, a program aiming at improving 
R&D and technology development through matching grants. They find positive effects of 57 to 
79% on innovation investment, but no significant impacts on labor productivity or new product 
sales. Similarly, for the case of ADTEN, a subsidy program for R&D and technological 
development in Brazil, De Negri et al (2006) find increased R&D expenditures by 50 to 90% but 
no impact on sales, employment and labor productivity. Benavente, Crespi and Maffioli (2007) 
study the Chilean FONTEC, designed to promote technology transfer and development and 
R&D support. The authors estimate a 40% increase on sales growth and 3% increase on export 
intensity, although they find no impact on labor productivity in Chile. 
Building on this results, López Acevedo and Tan (2010) provide an evaluation of SME 
credit programs in Mexico (Nafinsa, Bancomext, CONACyT, STPS and other programs from the 
Ministry of Economy), Chile (SENCE, CORFO, PROCHILE, FONDEF), Colombia 
(FOMIPYME) and Peru (BONOPYME, PROMPYME, CITE). The authors find positive gains in 
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sales, labor productivity and employment in Chile, and higher value added, sales, export and 
employment in Mexico. In Colombia, the results suggest positive effects on exports, investment 
in R&D and TFP. Finally, in Peru the findings show significant positive effects in sales and 
profits. Confirming the findings of Hall and Maffioli, López Acevedo and Tan note that some of 
the estimated impacts do not materialize until after several years. Thus, they claim that the lack 
of impact of previous studies may be due to the short time dimension of the available databases, 
and remark the importance not only of controlling for potential selection biases but also to 




3. Public Credit Programs in Brazil 
One important aspect of Latin American financial markets is the likelihood that firms are credit 
constrained and rely too heavily on their own sources to finance investment (Galindo and 
Schiantarelli, 2003, IDB, 2005). For instance, using data from The World Bank, approximately 
25% of firms consider that they are credit constrained in Colombia. In Brazil, Bond, Soderbon 
and Wu (2007) estimate that about 40% of firms are credit constrained using the same data from 
2000-2003.  
This has negative implications for aggregate investment levels. Various factors contribute 
in generating credit constraints for MSMEs; from the demand side: their size, lack of collateral, 
and their technical deficiencies to manage and/or implement sustainable investment projects. 
From the supply side: limited medium- and long-term sources of funding in the domestic market 
and  lack of transparency and information to conduct proper credit risk assessments, leading to 
reduced banks’ appetite to serve this particular market segment.  
Under this scenario, institutions such as BNDES in Brazil or Bancóldex in Colombia, 
with their access to domestic and foreign sources of medium- and long-term funding would most 
certainly be easing credit constraints, improving investment levels and generating a more 
efficient allocation. 
The main objective of public credit programs is to support increased competitiveness and 
job creation in (MSMEs) by channeling medium- and long-term financing for investments. The 
Bank resources are added to those of development agencies or banks, commingled without 
distinction, and disbursed through programs under their indirect operations system. IFIs must 
comply with all Central Bank regulations and are responsible for evaluating the risk associated 
with sub-borrowers and the decision to grant financing. Program funds will be used to finance 
fixed investments or permanent working capital associated with the execution of investment 
projects by qualifying MSMEs.  
In Brazil, while BNDES is not the only source of public credit, it is by and large the one 
with the biggest outlays for machinery and equipment acquisition: it accounts for 20% of all 
credit demand in the economy and 5% of GDP. Many public banks, such as regional 
development banks act only as financial intermediaries to BNDES, basically. The other two large 
public banks, Banco do Brasil and Caixa, provide mainly agriculture credit and housing credit, 
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respectively, as well as acting as financial intermediaries to BNDES. Furthermore, the 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projectos (FINEP) is the Brazilian innovation agency and provides 





4. Data Description 
For the purpose of this study, we rely on a unique dataset based on the combination of existing 
administrative and statistical information6. Our final database is an unbalanced panel containing annual 
firm level information from 1997 to 2007. The main source of information are two administrative 
datasets: the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), which is an administrative file maintained by 
the Brazilian Ministry of Employment and Labor (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, MTE), and the 
Foreign Trade Dataset from the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX) of the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC). RAIS has a universal coverage: all registered tax-paying 
establishments must send every year to the Ministry information about every single worker who had been 
employed by the establishment anytime during the reference year. The RAIS information provides a 
matched employer-employee longitudinal data set, similar to those available in developed countries. The 
data from SECEX provide information on the value of export of all Brazilian exporters for the same 
period covered by RAIS. The two datasets were matched through a unique firm identifier number 
(Cadastro Nacoinal de Pessoa Juridica, CNPJ). 
The novelty of the RAIS data is the possibility to match the employer-employee structure with 
detailed information available on workers' occupation, wages and schooling. So, the main use of RAIS 
will be to provide the labor inputs variables. In addition, the SECEX data provides reliable information 
regarding the value of total exports of firms. The coverage of the combined database includes all firms 
that declare hiring workers in Brazil since 1996. For instance, in 2001, this represents more than 76 
millions of workers declared in more than 230 thousand firms from a range of manufacturing types. The 
panel data information allows classifying firms by activity, size, age of the firm and region of activity.  
Finally, to capture the beneficiaries of public credit in Brazilian firms, we benefitted from a novel 
database of public credit use collected by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de 
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA). This database has the foremost advantage of being able to cross-
reference the information using the CNPJ of each firm with other databases at the firm level in Brazil. 
This information was available in an annual frequency from 1997 to 2007.  
There are two main advantages of using a database with the characteristics described above. First, 
the large number of observations (firms) makes statistically feasible to find firms that did not participate 
in the program with similar characteristics to the ones that actually did participate (counterfactual). 
Second, the panel data structure allows controlling for non-observable effects that determine program 
participation and firm performance. Nevertheless, the main disadvantage is that RAIS database does not 
have information regarding total sales, and hence, it is not possible to construct total factor productivity 
                                                            
6 The details and definitions of the variables used appear in the Appendix I. 
10 
 
(TFP) measures. Still, it can be argued that total salary expenditure and total exports have a close 
relationship with firms’ TFP. Formally, from basic production theory, real wages are a measure of labor 
productivity. Under this hypothesis, evaluating the impact of the program in terms of average real wages 
would be an approximation of the impact in terms of labor productivity. Nevertheless, there are also 
arguments that challenge this view. For instance, the existence of collective wage agreements, special 
benefits for years worked in the firm or efficiency wages. To deal with a more precise measure of real 
wages we construct a synthetic measure of average standardized wages that represents an approximation 
of labor productivity at the firm level. Annex I describes the construction of this variable.  
Given the nature of the data and the fact that public credit programs have been in place since 
before 1997 we needed to make a decision regarding which year should be considered as the starting 
point for our analysis. In other words, these programs have been in place for years before the first year of 
the sample we have -1997-, and are still active throughout the entire sample.  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of such intervention we need to consider an alternative 
starting point for those programs. This decision is far from trivial and inevitably involves some 
discretionarily, but such simplification, if something, should go in the direction of underestimating the 
long-run effect of the use of public credit. Assuming this caveat and its consequences we therefore 
decided to consider 2001 as the alternative starting point of the use of public credit in Brazil mainly based 
on a statistical argument. Thus, all the firms that enter the program before or after 2001 are excluded from 
the analysis. The decision is based on the fact that the year 2001 divides the sample evenly such that it 
maximizes the statistical power of the analysis by placing an equal number of years before and after the 
chosen starting year. Needless to say, we understand our results as a first and therefore preliminary 
analysis of the impact of such program.  
4.1 Baseline Characteristics 
Table 1 shows that in 2001, public credit use comprises almost 17 thousand firms of which 23% were 
exporters. Almost a third of the beneficiary firms are producers of food and plastic, mainly concentrated 







Table 1. Main Characteristics of Public Credit Recipients in 2001 
  
Treated  Controls 
Number Distribution Number Distribution
Firms 16,700 100% 215,183 100%
          
Exporters 3,786 23% 6,963 3%
Non-exporters 12,914 77% 208,220 97%
          
Sectors:         
Coal extraction 9 0% 80 0%
Oil and Natural Gas extraction 3 0% 141 0%
Metallic mineral extraction 26 0% 246 0%
Non-metallic mineral extraction 613 4% 4,396 2%
Foods and beverages 2,826 17% 31,725 15%
Tobacco 10 0% 131 0%
Textile 693 4% 8,440 4%
Clothing and accessories 600 4% 33,971 16%
Leather 412 2% 9,830 5%
Wood products 1,030 6% 14,080 7%
Paper products 372 2% 2,300 1%
Edition and printing 611 4% 14,391 7%
Petroleum refining 86 1% 129 0%
Chemical products 798 5% 6,430 3%
Rubber and plastic 1,727 10% 7,665 4%
Manufacture of non-metallic 
minerals 1,309 8% 16,696 8%
Basic metals 510 3% 4,173 2%
Manufacture of metal products 1,584 9% 20,874 10%
Machinery and equipment 1,205 7% 8,378 4%
Computer equipment 31 0% 420 0%
Electric machinery and equipment 301 2% 2,927 1%
Electronics 99 1% 1,294 1%
Medical equipment and precision 
instruments 138 1% 1,591 1%
Fabrication and assembly of 
automotive vehicles 456 3% 3,075 1%
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 48 0% 952 0%
Furniture 1,156 7% 20,028 9%
Recycling 47 0% 820 0%
          





North 385 2% 5,645 3%
Northeast 3,425 21% 52,297 24%
Southeast 6,593 39% 82,592 38%
South 5,667 34% 62,000 29%
West 630 4% 12,649 6%
          
Size (employment):         
Micro (<5) 2,151 13% 121,013 56%
Small (5-100) 11,148 67% 90,427 42%
Medium (100-500) 2,627 16% 3,293 2%
Large (>500) 774 5% 450 0%
          
Multinational:         
0 16,190 97% 213,409 99%
1 510 3% 1,774 1%
          
 
In Table 2 we present summary statistics for the outcomes and covariate variables before 
the beginning of the program in 2001, for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of public credit. It 
can be seen that beneficiaries have systematic greater magnitudes in all variables (employment, 
total wage expenditure, total exports, total imports, total age of the firm, average credit size and 
average standardized wage) and their difference with non-beneficiaries is strongly significant.7 
The information presented here is consistent with the previous table and is giving 
evidence suggesting that firms that enter the program are larger in size, they spend more in 
wages, they export and import more, they are older, they take more public credit and they have a 
higher average standardized wage than the rest. In fact, this could be reflecting the presence of 
unobserved factors affecting the participation decision. The identification strategy, to be 
explained below, will take into consideration these issues to find appropriate control firms and 





7 Appendix I present a description of the variables used and its construction. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  
Treated  Controls t-test 
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. T p-value 
Employment 135 662 14 76 83.0 0.00 
Salary Expenditure (Ths R$) 2,749,683 28,400,000 188,421 2,448,082 40.9 0.00 
Exports (US$) 1,948,057 32,800,000 66,405 6,558,752 26.0 0.00 
Imports (US$) 1,453,841 49,700,000 76,486 4,716,537 12.6 0.00 
Age of the firm 14.95 1.86 1.44 7.59 2113.2 0.00 
Public Credit (Ths R$) 940 18,455 0 0 23.1 0.00 
Profits per worker (Ths R$) 0.04 0.51 -0.08 0.68 92.1 0.00 
              
 
Furthermore, when inspecting the trends of the main outcomes (exports, employment, and profits 
per worker) before the starting of the program –between 1997 and 2000-, it can be seen that there is a 
different behavior between treated and non-treated firms. Figures 1 to 3 show pre-treatment trends 
behavior for exports, employment and average standardized wage. Although at first sight the pre-
treatment performance may look alike between treated and non-treated firms, when performing a test of 
equality of trends the null hypothesis of equality is rejected.8 This divergent performance could be due, 
among other factors, to the fact that the non beneficiaries are a very heterogeneous group of firms and 
may not constitute an accurate comparison group for treated firms. To analyze the impact of the program 
in such setup will require finding an appropriate counterfactual to the treated firms. This will be the first 








8 Tables available upon request to Alessandro Maffioli (alessandrom@iadb.org). 
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5. Identification Strategy 
We will use the group of non-participating firms to estimate the counterfactual outcome of the 
treated firms, i.e. to calculate what would have the outcome been for treated firms, had they not 
been treated. However, as the previous section suggests, the pool of untreated firms is not 
necessarily comparable to the group of beneficiaries, since the intervention is not randomly 
assigned and hence potential issues of self-selection and administrative selection bias arise which 
can seriously compromise the validity of the estimations. 
Several techniques can be used to avoid these potential problems. We will use two 
methods to deal with selection bias, namely, standard fixed-effects regressions and a 
combination of fixed effects and propensity score matching. 
First, if participation is determined by observable factors, these variables can be included 
as control variables in a regression framework. However, some of these relevant factors may be 
unobservable (for instance, entrepreneurial behavior of the firm, manager characteristics, etc), 
and thus cannot be accounted for. Nevertheless, the panel structure of our database allows us to 
eliminate all unobservable factors, as long as they do not vary with time, using a fixed-effects 
model. 
More rigorously, we propose the following specification: 
 (1) 
where  is the outcome of the firm i in year t,  captures all time-constant factors that affect 
the outcome and are firm-specific,  represents yearly shocks that affect all firms,  is a binary 
variable that takes the value one since the year in which the firm i enters the program,  is a 
vector of time-varying control variables and  is the usual error term assumed to be 
uncorrelated with . The standard errors will be clustered at the firm level for the inference to 
be robust to within-firm correlation of the error terms. In absence of time-varying unobserved 
factors that affect both the outcome and the participation, the fixed-effects method leads to 
consistent estimator for , the impact of the program. 
The validity of the difference-in-differences (fixed-effects) estimator rests on the 
identification assumption that trends in the outcomes would have been equal in absence of 
treatment. However, this assumption may be difficult to accept when firms in the control group 
are very heterogeneous and very different from the participating firms, since firms that are very 
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different are likely to follow different trends as well. In order to reinforce the results, we also run 
equation (1) on a matched sample, selecting among the firms in the comparison group those that 
are more similar to beneficiaries not only in terms of observed characteristics but also on their 
pre-treatment performance. We do this to ensure that we selecting from the control group only 
those which have pre-treatment trends that are similar to those in the treated group. 
More precisely, we define the year previous to treatment as a baseline year and estimate 
the propensity score, i.e. co r bi f i ation, using a probit model:  the nditional p oba lity o  partic p
1| , Φ   (2) 
for a fixed pre-treatment year t, where  is a vector of covariates,  is a vector of k lags of the 
outcome variable, , … , and Φ is the standard Normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
We use a different probit for each outcome. Since the main objective of the matching is 
to ensure that ex-ante trends are similar between groups, we argue that running separate probits 
for each outcome is a more flexible strategy to find appropriate matches for each treated firm; 
this is so because, for instance, a comparison firm may be a good match for a treated firm in 
terms of ex-ante trends in exports but may follow a different dynamic in employment. Therefore, 
running separate probits allows finding better matches for each outcome. The main disadvantage 
of this choice is that the resulting control groups are different for each outcome, which may 
complicate the comparison of the results across outcomes. However, considering the importance 
of the similarity of trends for the validity of the estimations, we believe that the advantages of 
this choice outweigh its costs.  
Using the predicted probability of participation, we match each treated firm with the 
untreated firm with most similar propensity score; we then drop from the database all the 






6. Estimation Results 
Results will be presented firstly for the full sample as a whole and then only focusing on the 
common support that will be explained and constructed below. 
6.1 Full Sample Results 
This section summarizes the results obtained by estimating equation (1) using the fixed effects 
estimator for the three outcomes of interest: employment (in logs), total exports (in logs) and 
labor productivity. The participation variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 once the firm 
started participating in the public credit program.  
Table 3 shows the impact of the program in employment. The dependent variable is the 
total number workers expressed in logarithms. Column 1 shows a strongly significant and 
positive effect of around 23%9 when only controlling for time dummies. Column 2 shows that 
this effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables; the coefficient increases to 25%. Finally, 
column 3 includes industry-year interaction terms, which allow for differential time trends across 
industry sectors. The results are indistinguishable from the ones in column 2. Hence, although 
the effect of the program decreases as we control for observables, it does not differ significantly 
by adding control variables. When interpreting these impacts we need to take into account the 
trajectories of the control and the treated group throughout the period of analysis. At the 
baseline, the matched sample of treated firms exhibit on average 100 employees per firm, hence 










9  More precisely, since the treatment variable is binary and the outcome is measured in logarithms, the correct way 
to interpret the coefficient is to calculate exp(b)-1. However, the “raw” coefficient is in most cases a very close 
approximation to the discrete impact, and hence we use what we consider the more straightforward way of 
interpreting the results. 
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Table 3: impact on Employment (Full Sample) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
BNDES   0.2307*** 0.2531*** 0.2528*** 
    (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
lage     0.8756*** 0.8762*** 
      (0.016) (0.016) 
lskill     0.1333*** 0.1322*** 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
lwage     0.1011*** 0.1016*** 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
patentes     0.0055 0.0060 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
finep     0.2726*** 0.2672*** 
      (0.066) (0.066) 
premio     0.1338*** 0.1334*** 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
limp     0.0212*** 0.0211*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant   2.2865*** -0.8945*** -0.9151*** 
    (0.002) (0.060) (0.060) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
R2   0.02  0.071  0.073  
Obs.   492480  492480  492480  
No. of firms   49248  49248  49248  
_________________ 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4 shows the impact of the program in exports. The dependent variable is total 
exports expressed in logarithms. This variable is constructed in such a way that if a firm has no 
exports in a given year, a value of one is assigned. This procedure allows us to construct a 
logarithmic version of total exports with no missing values. Through this mechanism, the 
interpretation of the impact of the program in this variable is the same as the logarithm of 
employment. Column 1 reveals a strongly significant positive impact of 47% on exports when 
controlling for time dummies. The estimated impact decreases after the addition of control 
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variables, but remains large and significant (39%). This effect is robust to the inclusion of 
industry-year interaction terms. 
Table 4. Impact on Exports (Full Sample) 
          
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   0.4765*** 0.3880*** 0.3896*** 
    (0.095) (0.080) (0.080) 
lage     0.0449 0.0434 
      (0.038) (0.039) 
lskill     0.0347*** 0.0338*** 
      (0.012) (0.012) 
lwage     0.0395*** 0.0399*** 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
patentes     -0.0082 -0.0075 
      (0.017) (0.017) 
finep     1.0418*** 1.0307*** 
      (0.368) (0.368) 
premio     5.8490*** 5.8482*** 
      (0.064) (0.064) 
limp     0.0717*** 0.0717*** 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant   0.7106*** -0.1515 -0.1544 
    (0.007) (0.115) (0.115) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.02  0.297  0.30  
Obs.   492480  492480  492480  
No. of firms   49248  49248  49248  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 5 shows the impact of the program in labor productivity. According to the first set 
of estimations, none of the specifications detect a significant impact. This lack of impact might 
seem counterintuitive. A word of caution is needed here.  In this specific case, the lack of impact 
could be also related to way we are approximating labor productivity, i.e. through real wages, 
because real wages may change slower than real labor productivity.    
 
Table 5. Impact on Labor Productivity (Full Sample) 
          
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   -0.00002 0.0011 0.0016 
    (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
lage     -0.1056*** -0.1079*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) 
lskill     0.0004 0.0004 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
lwage     0.6521*** 0.6522*** 
      (0.020) (0.020) 
patentes     -0.0006 -0.0006 
      (0.002) (0.002) 
finep     0.0402 0.0400 
      (0.049) (0.049) 
premio     -0.0147** -0.0147** 
      (0.006) (0.006) 
limp     -0.0048*** -0.0048*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant   -0.0403*** -4.4089*** -4.4116*** 
    (0.002) (0.132) (0.132) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.007  0.255  0.255  
Obs.   492460  492460  492460  
No. of firms   49248  49248  49248  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 




6.2 Construction of the Matched Sample 
One possible concern with the previous estimations is that the control group is very 
heterogeneous and thus not necessarily comparable to the treated firms. To reinforce the validity 
of the results, we need to select from the control group a subgroup of firms that are much more 
similar to treated firms in terms of observable characteristics. 
More precisely, we use matching techniques to pair each treated firm to the most similar 
untreated firm. We do this in two steps. We first estimate a probit model for the propensity score 
(i.e. the conditional probability of participation) for each firm using a vector of observed 
characteristics as predictors. We then match each beneficiary with the untreated firm with more 
similar propensity score, and we run the previous results on this new matched sample, dropping 
all the untreated firms that are never used as a comparison.  
The probit model is run on the year previous to treatment to ensure that none of the 
predictors are affected by the intervention. In addition to standard control variables like age and 
industry sector, we also include several lags of the outcome variable to match not only on the 
values of observable characteristics but also to ensure that treated and control firms followed 
similar paths before treatment. As described in the methodological section this is a necessary 
condition for the difference in difference (fixed effects) estimator to be consistent. In particular, 
we run three different probit models to perform separate analyses for each outcome. In each one 
of these, we use four lags of the corresponding outcome variable to capture pre-treatment trends, 
plus a set of control variables as shown in tables 6 to 8.  
The results of the probit models for 2001 are presented in table 6. The dependent variable 










Table 6. Participation Model 
             
    Ln(employment)   Ln(exports)  
Labor 
productivity 
             
Yit-1   0.45***   0.025***  0.01 
    (0.061)   (0.008)  (0.05) 
Yit-2   -0.14*   0.005  -0.021 
    (0.08)   (0.009)  (0.056) 
Yit-3   0.043   0.01  -0.005 
    (0.07)   (0.009)  (0.058) 
Yit-4   -0.053   -0.017**  0.023 
    (0.039)   (0.008)  (0.045) 
lage   -0.173***   -0.109***  -0.103*** 
    (0.044)   (0.036)  (0.036) 
lskill   0.258***   0.193***  0.185*** 
    (0.073)   (0.071)  (0.07) 
lwage   0.134***   0.173***  0.177*** 
    (0.043)   (0.042)  (0.052) 
multi   -0.553***   -0.63***  -0.578*** 
    (0.11)   (0.11)  (0.11) 
patentes   0.039   0.059*  0.058* 
    (0.035)   (0.034)  (0.034) 
premio   0.154***   0.072  0.219*** 
    (0.059)   (0.067)  (0.06) 
limp   0.02***   0.027***  0.031*** 
    (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
clapo_0   0.117   -1.117***  -1.089*** 
    (0.173)   (0.145)  (0.078) 
clapo_1   0.329**   -0.491***  -0.456*** 
    (0.148)   (0.136)  (0.062) 
clapo_2   0.239*   -0.097  0.161 
    (0.134)   (0.132)  (0.13) 
Constant   -4.279***   -3.133***  -3.003*** 
    (0.34)   (0.324)  (0.344) 
Pseudo R2 0.123    0.1035   0.1001  
Obs.   49248    49248   49242  
             
Regressions also control for geographical and industry  dummies     




From each probit model, we can conclude that the oldest firms with the most skilled 
workers and the highest wage expenditures have a higher probability of participating in the 
public credit program. Similarly, compared to the largest firms, smaller ones have more 
probability of participating in the program. This information is consistent with the summary 
statistics described above and gives evidence of a participation bias. In other words, we need to 
control for this selection bias to be able to attribute to the program the difference in outcomes 
between treated and non-treated firms. If we leave this issue unattained, the difference in 
outcomes may be given by the pre-treatment difference between treated and non-treated. 
With the probit models estimates, we predict the probability of participation and match 
each beneficiary with the non-beneficiary with closest propensity score. We construct this 
control group using the one-nearest-neighbor algorithm. Finally, we drop from our sample all the 
control firms that are not matched to any treated firm. (See figures 4 to 6). 
 































































Tables A1 to A3 (see Appendix II) show the balancing test for the covariates included in 
each participation equation considering a control group defined by the matching procedure. In 
fact, after the matching, the hypothesis of equality of means of observable characteristics for 
both treated and untreated firms cannot be rejected. In sum, both the graphical evidence and the 
statistical tests suggest that the matching is successful in constructing a control group that is very 
similar to the treated group. Once these characteristics (including the pre-treatment trends) 
between participating and non-participating firms are balanced, the common support defined is 
free from selection bias and we can attribute the difference to the program participation. Thus, 
we can now proceed to run the previous regressions in this new matched sample. 
6.3 Matched Sample Results 
Tables 7 to 10 present the results of the estimation over the common support. In general, the 
results for the matched sample are very similar to the ones for the full sample. The estimated 
impact on employment is again around 24% and around 40% for exports, while we find no 














Table 7. Impact on Employment (Matched Sample) 
        
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   0.2462*** 0.2404*** 0.2395*** 
    (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) 
lage     1.1563*** 1.1577*** 
      (0.090) (0.091) 
lskill     0.0186 0.0201 
      (0.075) (0.075) 
lwage     -0.0197 -0.0229 
      (0.088) (0.087) 
patentes     0.0049 0.0061 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
finep     0.3183*** 0.3253*** 
      (0.079) (0.079) 
premio     0.1085*** 0.1076*** 
      (0.027) (0.027) 
limp     0.0262*** 0.0262*** 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant   3.1698*** 0.1734 0.1944 
    (0.014) (0.611) (0.604) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.09  0.171  0.176  
Obs.   15700  15700  15700  
No. of firms   1570  1570  1570  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 8. Impact on Exports (Matched Sample) 
          
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   0.5358*** 0.4060*** 0.3979*** 
    (0.119) (0.102) (0.102) 
lage     0.0073 -0.0014 
      (0.309) (0.312) 
lskill     -0.1072 -0.1191 
      (0.184) (0.184) 
lwage     0.2976* 0.2987* 
      (0.159) (0.160) 
patentes     0.0931 0.0975 
      (0.076) (0.075) 
finep     1.9314 1.9102 
      (1.353) (1.349) 
premio     4.4198*** 4.4214*** 
      (0.213) (0.212) 
limp     0.0913*** 0.0912*** 
      (0.015) (0.014) 
Constant   2.4279*** -0.1550 -0.0874 
    (0.060) (1.374) (1.373) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.01  0.208  0.21  
Obs.   15800  15800  15800  
No. of firms   1580  1580  1580  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 9. Impact on Labor Productivity (Matched Sample) 
          
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   -0.0054 -0.0063 -0.0067 
    (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
lage     -0.1051* -0.1082* 
      (0.056) (0.056) 
lskill     0.1374*** 0.1367*** 
      (0.051) (0.051) 
lwage     0.8182*** 0.8186*** 
      (0.143) (0.143) 
patentes     -0.0089 -0.0084 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
finep     -0.0902 -0.0908 
      (0.133) (0.133) 
premio     -0.0275 -0.0276 
      (0.019) (0.019) 
limp     -0.0057** -0.0058** 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant   0.0708*** -5.3923*** -5.3580*** 
    (0.014) (0.838) (0.838) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.009  0.323  0.324  
Obs.   15790  15790  15790  
No. of firms   1579  1579  1579  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
One potential concern with the results for exports is that the estimators are mixing two 
distinct possible effects: on the one hand, the program may increase export volumes, but also 
change the pool of exporting firms by inducing firms to start exporting. To address this issue, we 
perform two separate analyses. First, we study the impact of the program on the probability of a 
firm being an exporter using as the outcome of interest a binary variable that takes the value one 
if the firm has non-zero exports. To estimate this specification we use a linear probability model. 
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Such model has some limitations with respect to its close-related probit or logit, mainly the fact 
that marginal effects are constant10. Nevertheless, it has the advantage of straightforwardly 
controlling for fixed effects. The results of these estimations are presented in table 10. 
Table 10. Impact on Probability of Exporting (Matched Sample) 
          
      
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   0.0197* 0.0108 0.0112 
    (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
lage     -0.0007 -0.0015 
      (0.027) (0.027) 
lskill     -0.0112 -0.0120 
      (0.017) (0.017) 
lwage     0.0144 0.0147 
      (0.011) (0.011) 
patentes     0.0038 0.0045 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
finep     0.0886 0.0908 
      (0.086) (0.084) 
premio     0.4506*** 0.4510*** 
      (0.019) (0.019) 
limp     0.0068*** 0.0068*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant   0.1984*** 0.0690 0.0702 
    (0.006) (0.114) (0.114) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.005  0.224  0.227  
Obs.   15830  15830  15830  
No. of firms   1583  1583  1583  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                            
10  Another drawback of the linear probability model is that it does not guarantee that the predicted probability to be 
between zero and one, although this is irrelevant in this case where the estimates are not used for prediction 
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In principle, it can be argued that firms that move from non-exporter to exporter are those 
that were able to overcome credit constraint and access international markets. In other words, 
those firms that were affected by the program and increase their productivity by moving to 
international markets are the most productive ones. As the table shows, we find no significant 
impact on the probability of exporting. This finding suggests that the positive impact found in the 
previous estimations must be mainly driven by the increase in export volumes among firms that 
were already exporting. 
To further test this hypothesis, we now study the effect of the program on export volumes 
by restricting the sample to firms that were already exporting in the two years previous to 

















Table 11. Impact on Quantity Exported (Matched Sample) 
          
    (1) (2) (3) 
PUCR   1.1504*** 1.0086*** 1.0073*** 
    (0.374) (0.338) (0.338) 
lage     -1.1934 -1.0868 
      (1.449) (1.458) 
lskill     0.3043 0.4070 
      (0.995) (0.991) 
lwage     0.9161** 0.8149* 
      (0.434) (0.424) 
patentes     -0.0376 -0.0430 
      (0.094) (0.090) 
finep     1.5790*** 1.5522*** 
      (0.442) (0.458) 
premio     2.5402*** 2.5346*** 
      (0.221) (0.219) 
limp     0.1336*** 0.1358*** 
      (0.032) (0.032) 
Constant   11.0240*** 2.8974 2.8140 
    (0.207) (5.797) (5.818) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.057 0.190 0.200 
Obs.   3140  3140  3140  
No. of firms   314 314 314 
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The findings reveal very large and significant impacts, supporting the hypothesis that the 
effect on exports is almost entirely driven by the increase in export volumes among exporting 
firms, while not affecting the probability of becoming an exporter. 
In sum, the results for the matched sample confirm the previous findings; we estimate 
positive and large impacts on employment and exports, but not for the average standardized 
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wages. Moreover, the impact on exports is driven by the increase in export volumes among 
exporting firms. 
6.4 Dynamic Effects of the Program 
While the previous results estimate the average impact for the whole post-treatment period, we 
now set the attention on analyzing the dynamic pattern of these effects. In other words, the 
interest is to disentangle the effect of the program to understand if those effects are constant or 
vary over time.  
We modify our econometric specification by replacing the treatment variable with a 
dummy variable  that takes the value one in the first year of treatment and zero otherwise. 
Also we will use several lags of this variable, , each one of those indicating the impact of 































Table 12. Dynamic Effects (Matched Sample) 
          
 
  Ln(employment) Ln(exports) 
Profits per 
worker 
Dt   0.1373*** 0.1191 0.0016 
    (0.019) (0.117) (0.014) 
Dt-1   0.1838*** 0.3923*** -0.0089 
    (0.024) (0.119) (0.013) 
Dt-2   0.2201*** 0.4076*** -0.0123 
    (0.027) (0.127) (0.013) 
Dt-3   0.2774*** 0.5646*** -0.0095 
    (0.031) (0.140) (0.015) 
Dt-4   0.2971*** 0.5262*** 0.0084 
    (0.036) (0.140) (0.018) 
Dt-5   0.3227*** 0.3787*** -0.0198 
    (0.042) (0.140) (0.026) 
lage   1.1604*** 0.0015 -0.1083* 
    (0.091) (0.312) (0.056) 
lskill   0.0175 -0.1267 0.1370*** 
    (0.075) (0.184) (0.051) 
lwage   -0.0256 0.2955* 0.8188*** 
    (0.087) (0.159) (0.143) 
patentes   0.0063 0.0991 -0.0085 
    (0.009) (0.074) (0.009) 
finep   0.3144*** 1.8690 -0.0931 
    (0.080) (1.349) (0.133) 
premio   0.1079*** 4.4214*** -0.0275 
    (0.027) (0.212) (0.019) 
limp   0.0261*** 0.0914*** -0.0058** 
    (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) 
Constant   0.2139 -0.0555 -5.3758*** 
    (0.605) (1.370) (0.839) 
Fixed effects    
Time dummies    
Industry-year interactions    
          
R2   0.18  0.211  0.324  
Obs.   15700  15800  15790  
No. of firms   1570  1580  1579  
          
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The impact on employment is always significantly positive and increases with time. In 
figure 7 these effects are depicted with its corresponding standard error. It is clear the strong and 
significant positive trend that the treatment has. 








1 2 3 4 5 6
Years since treatment
95% confidence interval
In the case of exports, the impact of the program seems to take longer to appear in the 
regressions, since the coefficient for the first dummy is insignificant. The dynamic impact 
exhibits an inverted U-shape, increasing during most of the years but slightly decreasing in the 
last one. This pattern is displayed in figure 8 and although this evidence is preliminary it 
suggests the existence of an optimal duration of the treatment.  















The main objective of this paper was to provide evidence on the effectiveness of public credit 
line in Brazil. We find that access to public credit lines has a significant and robust positive 
impact on employment and exports, while we do not find evidence of a significant effect on our 
measure of productivity. Interestingly enough, our findings show that impact on exports is 
mainly driven by the increase in export volumes among exporting firms, while we do not 
significant effect on the probability of becoming an exporter.  
These results suggest that the second-tier public credit system effectively foster firms’ 
growth and, more specifically, it helps exporters to maintain and increase their operations, while 
they do not provide conclusive evidence of productivity gains. Some caution is probably needed 
when interpreting this lack of effect on productivity: in this case, the result may be more related 
to the specific indicator we are using rather than to a real lack of impact. In fact, one would 
expect a simultaneous increase of export and employment to be accompanied by improvements 
in productivity. Unfortunately, due to data limitation, we could not compute our preferred 
measure of productivity, TFP, and, therefore, we have to acknowledge that our results remain 
inconclusive in this particular aspect.   
Because of the relevance and size of the state-owned Banks in Brazil, our findings offer a 
valuable contribution to the debate on which policy instruments should be used to support the 
development of a competitive productive system in emerging countries. Sound and wide access 
to credit has always been considered a key ingredient of any private sector development strategy. 
Our results show that the provision of credit through second-tier development banks in Brazil 
play a significant role in making credit available for firms and effectively improve firms 
competitiveness, in particular when measured in terms of volume of exports.  
However, as in the case of most empirical studies, a good dose of caution is needed when 
impact evaluation findings are used in a debate on the alternative use of public resources. First, 
although they are consistently robust under our specification, one should carefully consider the 
external validity of our results. We limit our analysis to a set of credit line managed by two key 
state-owned development Banks (BNDES and FINEP). Therefore, our results only reflect the 
effectiveness of these institutions. Expand their significance to other sources of public credit in 
Brazil or other countries would require a set of well define interpretative assumptions. Second, 
because of methodological reasons we have focus on a particular cohort of credit recipients. The 
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level effectiveness of public program could potentially depend on external factors that may vary 
other time. The period we considered may have been particularly problematic for private lenders 
and, therefore, we cannot exclude that the positive effects of the public credit lines we observe 
may depend on the that particular conjuncture. Finally, we are not able to complement our 
impact analysis with a similarly robust assessment of the efficiency of the credit lines we 
consider. Providing credit at certain condition could be quite costly for the public budgets. These 
costs should be more than compensated by the value of the benefits we observed in order to 
concluded that this specific use of public resources as a valuable return for the Brazilian society.  
This paper also contributes to the methodological debate on how to evaluate the 
effectiveness of programs aimed at supporting firm-level performances. In particular, we show 
how to take advantage of a data setting that not only allow us to reduce selection bias by 
controlling for firm level fixed effects, but also to further improve the credibility of the 
difference-in-difference assumption by matching treated and comparison groups on the pre-
treatment trends of the outcomes variables. Because administrative dataset with similar 
characteristics to the one we used are becoming more and more available, our estimation strategy 
may be replicated to evaluate similar programs in other emerging countries. 
These contributions notwithstanding, further research is certainly still need in this area. 
First, as explained before, our preferred measure of productivity, TFP, could not be computed 
with the data available for this study. Microdata on TFP are potentially available in Brazil, 
though only for manufacturing firms. A first extension of this study will consider this measure. 
Second, future research should expand the analysis beyond average treatment effects. With 
access to more detailed information about the characteristics of the credit lines, we could analyze 
the heterogeneous effects that access to public credit line may have depending on loan terms, 
targeted firms populations and other specific requirements of the credit lines. Third, future 
research should also focus on better understanding the relationship between credit conditions and 
performances. For this purpose, one should be able to not only control for firm-level pre-
treatment economic performances (which under reasonable assumptions could be consider a 
good proxy of a firm’s financial health), but also for the firm-level financial characteristics. This 
kind of data are more complicated to construct, but they are potentially available in financial 
systems with a certain level of supervision and they could provide a key contribution to a better 





Aivazian, Varouj, D. Mazumdar and E. Santor (2003). “Financial Constraints and Investment: 
Assessing the Impact of a World Bank Loan Program on Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Sri Lanka.” Working Paper 2003-37. Bank of Canada  
Bach, Laurent (2009). “Are Small and Medium Sized Firms Really Credit Constrained? 
Evidence from a French Targeted Credit Programme.” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking (submitted) 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2004). “Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit 
Constraints using a Directed Lending Program.” CEPR Discussion Paper 4681 
Beck, Thorsten, A. Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic (2005). “Financial and Legal Constraints 
to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?” The Journal of Finance, 60(1), 137-177 
Bellone, Flora, P. Musso, L. Nesta and S. Schiavo (2010). “Financial Constraints and Firm 
Export Behaviour.” The World Economy, 33(3), 347-373 
Benavente, José Miguel and Gustavo Crespi (2003). “The Impact of Associative Strategy (the 
PROFO Program) on Small and Medium Enterprises in Chile.” SEWPS Paper 88 
Benavente, José Miguel, G. Crespi and A. Maffioli (2007). “Public Support to Firm Level 
Innovation: a Evaluation of the FONTEC Program”. OVE Working Paper 05-07, Inter-
American Development Bank 
Coelho C.A., J. M. P. De Mello, and M. G. P. Garcia (2010). “Identifying the Bank Lending 
Channel in Brazil through Data Frequency.” Economia, 10(2), 44-77 
Chudnovsky, Daniel, A. López, M. Rossi and D. Ubfal (2006). “Evaluating a Program of Public 
Funding of Private Innovation Activities. An Econometric Study of FONTAR in 
Argentina.” OVE Working Paper 16-06, Inter-American Development Bank 
De Negri, João Alberto, M. Borges Lemos and F. De Negri (2006). “Impact of R&D Incentive 
Program on the Performance and Technological Efforts of Brazilian Industrial Firms.” 
OVE Working Paper 14-06, Inter-American Development Bank 
Hall, Bronwyn, and Alessandro Maffioli (2008). “Evaluating the Impact of Technology 
Development Funds in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Latin America.” European 
Journal of Development Research, 20(2), 172-198 
López Acevedo, Gladys and H. Tan (2010). Impact Evaluation of SME Programs in Latin 
America and Caribbean. The World Bank 
39 
 
Minetti, Raoul and S. C. Zhu (2010). “Credit Constraints and Firm Export: Microeconomic 
Evidence from Italy.” Mimeographed Document, Michigan State University 
Rendón, Silvio (2000). “Job Creation under Liquidity Constraints: The Spanish Case.” 
Mimeographed Document, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss (1981). “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 




Appendix I. Construction of Variables 
PUCR: dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the firm borrowed from either 
BNDES or FINEP in 2001. 
Employment: firm's total employment is constructed by counting the number of records in the 
PIS RAIS, weighting these counts by the number of months the employee was hired at the firm. 
For instance, an employee remaining employed throughout the year counts as being equal to 1, 
while if it remained employed for six months in the year it counts as 0.5. Thus this variable 
actually reflects the number of jobs provided by the firm during the year. 
Exports: total value in U.S. dollars (U.S. $ FOB) of export transactions per firm in each year. 
This information was obtained through the sum of all operations into a single total exports per 
firm per year. 
Labor Productivity: it is obtained through the difference between income and average income 
of the employee in the sector (CNAE4), in the unity of the federation (UF) and the class of 
personnel actions of the firms hired, according to the expression 
( )
i j l k m j l k m
i j l k m






where  represents the wage of the i-th employee in the j-th firm in the l-th location in the k-th sector 
of economic activity within the m-th size category. After the standardization of the average income of the 
employee, the averages are calculated for each firm, according to the expression: 
i j l kW
1
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Appendix 2. Balancing Tests 
Table A1. Balancing Tests (Employment) 
          
  
  Treated Control Difference
Yit-1   3.404 3.368 0.036 
Yit-2   3.284 3.243 0.041 
Yit-3   3.210 3.165 0.045 
Yit-4   3.029 2.971 0.058 
lage   2.758 2.743 0.015 
lskill   2.127 2.122 0.005 
lwage   6.719 6.722 -0.003 
multi   0.387 0.299 0.087 
patentes 0.056 0.075 -0.019 
premio   0.151 0.133 0.017 
limp   3.188 3.056 0.132 
clapo_0   0.062 0.363 -0.300 
clapo_1   0.753 0.778 -0.025 
clapo_2   0.146 0.145 0.001 
          
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  





Table A2. Balancing Tests (Exports) 
          
  
  Treated Control Difference
Yit-1   2.922 2.788 0.134 
Yit-2   2.685 2.557 0.128 
Yit-3   2.570 2.372 0.198 
Yit-4   2.293 2.112 0.181 
lage   2.758 2.734 0.024 
lskill   2.127 2.122 0.005 
lwage   6.719 6.717 0.002 
multi   0.039 0.026 0.012 
patentes 0.056 0.040 0.016 
premio   0.151 0.148 0.002 
limp   3.188 2.899 0.289 
clapo_0   0.070 0.067 0.003 
clapo_1   0.753 0.767 -0.014 
clapo_2   0.146 0.148 -0.002 
          
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  








Table A3. Balancing Tests (Labor Productivity) 
          
  
  Treated Control Difference
Yit-1   0.016 0.007 0.009 
Yit-2   -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0005 
Yit-3   -0.019 -0.025 0.006 
Yit-4   -0.026 -0.030 0.005 
lage   2.758 2.746 0.012 
lskill   2.127 2.122 0.005 
lwage   6.719 6.693 0.025 
multi   0.039 0.039 0.000 
patentes 0.056 0.039 0.017 
premio   0.151 0.141 0.010 
limp   3.188 3.114 0.074 
clapo_0   0.070 0.061 0.009 
clapo_1   0.753 0.774 -0.021 
clapo_2   0.146 0.142 0.004 
          
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
 
